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This paper contributes to the literature on ownership, control and performance by exploring 
these relationships for Swedish listed companies (1997-2002). We find that firms, on average, 
are making inferior investment decisions and that the use of dual-class shares have a negative 
effect on performance. According to our results concentration of ownership has a negative 
impact on investment performance and firm value when control instruments that separate 
votes from capital share are used. Marginal q is used as a measure of economic performance. 
It was presented in an article by Mueller and Reardon in 1993 and has recently been used in 
empirical  studies  of  ownership  and  performance  by  among  others  Gugler  and  Yurtoglu 
(2003). Frequently Tobin’s q is used in studies of this type, but Tobin’s q has a number of 
disadvantages which can be circumvented by employing a marginal q. This study adds to 
earlier studies by investigating how the separation of vote and capital shares’ creates a wedge 
between  the  incentives  and  the  ability  to  pursue  value  maximization.  The  relationships 
between  the  performance  measure  and  different  ownership  characteristics  like  ownership 
concentration and foreign ownership are also investigated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In their famous 1932 book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, Berle and Means 
discuss the problems related to the separation of ownership from control in large American 
corporations.  The  core  of  the  discussion  lies  in  that  ownership  of  large  companies  is  so 
dispersed that no single owner holds more than a tiny fraction of the listed shares in each one 
of them. As a consequence, no single shareholder has the ability or the incentive to exercise 
control over the company, which in turn leads to companies being inefficiently run. The lack 
of ability refers to the fact that, when ownership is widely dispersed, a single owner cannot 
individually have much influence on the way the company is being run. The lack of incentive 
on the other hand implies that, even if an owner has the possibility to promote changes, he or 
she will most probably refrain from exercising this possibility since he/she will have to share 
the  gains  with  all  other  shareholders  despite  the  fact  that  the  efforts  exerted  have  been 
exclusively personal. Thus, a problem of rational ignorance arises.  
 
In  Sweden  this  problem  is  somewhat  different  since  firms  are  allowed  to  have  vote-
differentiated shares, i.e. voting rights are frequently separated from the amount of capital 
invested. Consequently there is a possibility to retain control over a company by owning a 
relatively small fraction of the shares (equity). It seems reasonable to believe that this special 
characteristic of the Swedish stock market will have a certain impact on the performance of 
Swedish firms and create a special set of incentives that need to be considered. A wider 
spectrum of questions than the ones posed by Berle and Means (1932) can therefore be raised. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically address the impact of the relationship between the 
structure of ownership and control, and firm performance for Swedish listed firms. 
 
The novelty of this paper is that we make a distinction between the ability of owners to 
exercise control and the incentives the owners have to pursue profit maximization. We argue 
that the wide use of dual-class shares, with strong separation of voting power and capital 
share creates a wedge between the incentives and the ability to pursue shareholder value 
maximization.  
 
To estimate the effects of ownership characteristics and vote-differentiation we use marginal 
q as performance measure. Marginal q is more appropriate for this purpose as compared to 
Tobin’s q, because it measures marginal performance instead of average performance.  
 
The paper is organized in six sections. A theoretical discussion, where we attempt to shed 
some light on the existing theories on the relation between ownership and performance, is 
provided in Section two. In Section three the impact of portfolio and control incentives on 
ownership and performance is discussed from an exit and voice perspective. Section four 
presents  the  method  and  variables  used,  and  marginal  q  is  derived.  In  Section  five  our 
findings are presented and analyzed. Conclusions summarize the paper in Section six. 
 
 
2. The impact of ownership and control structure on firm performance 
 
The literature on corporate governance has primarily focused on large firms. One seminal 
contribution to this field was made by Berle and Means (1932), who devoted a whole book to 
the alleged detrimental effects of the separation of ownership and control, focusing on large 
corporations (joint stock companies) with dispersed ownership. Here it is claimed that, in an 
economy  characterized  by  larger  and  larger  corporations,  there  is  a  tendency  towards   3 
separation of ownership from control. Furthermore, investors are urged to be concerned about 
this because, in the words of the authors:  
 
“Suffice  it  here  to  realize  that  where  the  bulk  of  the  profits  of 
enterprise are scheduled to go to owners who are individuals others than those 
in control the interests of the latter are as likely as not to be at variance with 
those of ownership and that the controlling group is in a position to serve its 
own interests.”  
 
In other words – the increase of large corporations will have damaging effects on economic 
performance. It is interesting to note that Berle and Means (1932) use the term controlling 
group.  
 
A theoretical foundation for the agency problem inherent in the division of ownership and 
control  is  provided  by  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976).  By  developing  a  model  of  how  the 
interests of management and owners diverge when ownership and control are separated, the 
detrimental effects on firm value of a separation of ownership and control are rigorously 
demonstrated. In contrast to Berle and Means, they choose to address the problem by focusing 
on growing SMEs (Small and Medium sized Enterprises).  
 
In Jensen’s and Meckling’s model, the utility function of a controlling manager is assumed to 
have  firm  value  and  on-the-job-consumption  as  the  only  two  arguments.  On-the-job-
consumption is at the expense of firm value. Given standard assumptions of utility functions it 
is shown that the management, ceteris paribus, will be more and more inclined to cater to on-
the-job-consumption at the expense of firm value, as the dispersion of ownership increases.  
 
As outside owners are not working in the firm, shareholder value is presumably the only 
argument in their utility function. This means that on-the job-consumption does not enter into 
the utility functions of the outside owners. As a result there is a divergence of the interests 
between the controlling managers and the outside owners. 
 
In countries like Sweden which allow for vote-differentiation of shares it is important to make 
a distinction between the ability and the incentives to maximise firm value. The ability of the 
shareholder to exercise control of the management is determined by the voting power that can 
be exercised at the shareholders’ meeting. The incentives to exercise value-increasing control 
are,  however,  linked  to  what  portion  of  the  equity  of  the  firm  that  a  shareholder  owns. 
Ownership of large portion of equity means that a large portion of increases in firm value can 
be appropriated by an active shareholder. However, as Berle and Means (1932) clearly point 
out, the controlling group will always be in a position to serve its own interests, which may at 
times differ a lot from what would maximize firm value.   
 
By  having  vote-differentiated  shares  the  control  abilities  and  incentives  will  differ.  This 
divergence of ownership and control complicates the analysis. Although little research is done 
on the subject it is intuitive that such vote-differentiation will change the predictions of the 
Jensen and Meckling model. 
 
In Sweden the vote-differential can be as large as 1000 (when the so-called A-share carries 
1000 times more votes than a so-called B-share). For new firms in Sweden, however, the 
maximum allowed voting-right difference is 1-10. In contrast to, for example the US, dual-
class shares are frequently used in Sweden - about 55 per cent of all listed firms use vote   4 
differentiation (Tson Söderström et al, 2003). In fact, Sweden has the highest share of firms 
with vote-differentiated shares in Europe, see table 1.  
 
Table 1   Vote-differentiation in Europe   
Country   Number of 
Firms 
Number of firms with 
dual-class shares 
Share of firms with 
dual class shares 
Belgium  130    0    0.00   
Portugal  87    0    0.00   
Spain  632    1    0.00   
France  607    16    0.03   
Germany  704    124    0.18   
Austria  99    23    0.23   
Ireland  69    16    0.23   
Great Brittan  1953    467    0.24   
Denmark  210    70    0.33   
Finland  129    47    0.36   
Italy  208    86    0.41   
Sweden  334    185    0.55   
Total  5162    1035    0.20   
  Source: Bennedsen & Nielsen (2002), in: Tson Söderström et al. (2003) 
 
Proponents  defend  the  system  with  the  argument  that  it  constitutes  a  way  for  owners  to 
influence the management of large firms. Without this system the amount of capital needed 
and  the  risk  involved  in  loss  of  diversification  would  be  an  insurmountable  hurdle  to 
ownership control of management. On the other hand it can at the same time be claimed that a 
disadvantage of the system is the disproportion between capital share and control potential 
that arise with vote-differentiated shares. Such a disproportion has the effect that investors, 
other than the controlling shareholder, will benefit the most from effective control of the firm. 
The cost of catering to other than value maximising objectives will thus be lower in a dual-
share system than in a system with one share, one vote. The enhanced ability to control and 
distorted value maximising incentives are thus two opposing forces that must be considered in 
an analysis of the system. 
 
In  any  study  of  the  relationship  between  ownership,  control  and  performance,  the 
contributions of Marris (1964) and Manne (1965) have to be noted. They bring attention to 
the simple fact that a stock exchange is not just a market place for ownership rights in the 
sense of rights to a share of the residual income of the firm. The stock exchange is also a 
marketplace for the control rights attached to a share. An investor with knowledge of how to 
increase the residual income from a more efficient use of the resources of a firm can benefit 
from this knowledge by acquiring enough control rights to enforce such a value-rising change 
in the use of the resources. In this way a stock exchange will serve as a market for corporate 
control that will ensure that firms’ resources are used in a value enhancing way. However, for 
Sweden in particular, this may not be the case. Due to the specific characteristics of the 
Swedish stock market, with dual-class shares and often a pyramid ownership structure, there 
is virtually no active market for corporate control. 
 
Agnblad et al.(2001) have argued that these specificities of the Swedish corporate governance 
model might be economically more important than the effects of minority protection. Or to 
use their words (p. 230): 
 
“The Swedish corporate governance model with its strong separation 
between ownership and control locks in owners for long periods of time, 
even  from  one  generation  to  another.  The  widespread  use  of  dual-class   5 
shares  and pyramids  can  thus  have  substantial  costs  in  terms  of  loss  in 
dynamics in ownership and control.”   
 
 
3. Portfolio and Control Investments 
 
In the modern corporate finance literature a portfolio perspective is presented. Risk and return 
are stressed as the only utility arguments that matters. The important risk is the systematic risk 
from  which  it  is  impossible  to  diversify  away.  In  this  theory  the  control  aspect  of  stock 
ownership is disregarded. Owners and managers are assumed to have no other goal than to 
maximise the value of the firm. What the investor has to care about is only how to find 
combinations of assets that maximise the return given the level of risk or vice versa. In this 
paper a different approach is used where the control aspect is also taken into consideration. 
Different types of owners are assumed to have different preferences for the portfolio and 
control aspects of stock ownership. Institutional investors of domestic and foreign origin in 
charge of open mutual funds are separated out from other types of owners. 
 
Hence it is assumed that a portfolio theory perspective is likely to be especially useful in 
analyses of the behaviour of mutual funds (open-ended funds). A feature of the globalisation 
of the economy is that investment companies are offering mutual funds with assets from all 
parts  of  the  globe.  This  strive  towards  world-wide  coverage  is  partly  motivated  by  the 
advantages of international diversification on return and risk. The globalisation trend shows 
up in the increase of foreign ownership in most capital markets around the world. 
 
It is further assumed that foreign owners, predominantly in the form of foreign institutional 
investors such as pension funds etc., are primarily interested in the capital aspect of shares. 
They do not have any special interest in the voting power a share represents. Consequently we 
expect this type of investors in an economy like Sweden’s with vote differentiated shares to 
be biased towards acquiring shares with lower voting power.  
 
Investors acting in accordance with general portfolio theory are likely to frequently make 
adjustment in the composition of their portfolio in response to changes in stock performance 
in different markets. An exit from poorly performing shares and markets to better performing 
shares and markets can be expected. With large amounts to invest abroad the behaviour of 
these types of foreign investors is likely to have both a real stock price effect as well as a 
signalling  effect  to  other  investors  regarding  the  valuation  of  a  specific  firm.  Using 
Hirschman’s terminology global investment companies and their mutual funds is likely to be 
characterised by exit-type behaviour (Hirschman, 1970).
1 This reasoning leads us to formulate 
hypothesis I. 
 
Hypothesis I: The share of foreign ownership will be higher in well performing firms.  
 
Controlling owners, defined as the largest single owner, either in vote or equity, are investors 
that can be guided by many different incentives. Being more or less intimately involved in the 
control of the company, in which they have the largest ownership stake, it can be assumed 
that they are concerned about both the value of the firm and the opportunity to benefit from 
perks and other amenities. Such an assumption is justified by the fact that they usually belong 
to the type of investors that have both the knowledge and power to enforce firm actions as 
                                                 
1 A similar interpretation of the behavior of investors according to Hirschman’s classification can be found in 
Hedlund (1984).   6 
well as benefit from other than value-maximising uses of the resources of the firm. Even 
though they in a direct way can enforce value maximising behaviour, it is thus not self-
evident that value maximising behaviour is always their most important objective. In fact, 
many observers (i.e. Scitovsky, 1943, Knight, 1965) of the owner-led firm have stated that 
such owners might have many other objectives than profit or shareholder-value maximization 
(for a discussion see Mueller (2003)). To Schumpeter (1934) the entrepreneur (owner) even 
resembles a medieval knight setting out to create a “private kingdom” or a “dynasty”. Vote-
differentiated shares provide an opportunity to create a kingdom at a low cost. At least in 
short-term perspective owners aiming at control may exert influence that can be at odds with 
value-maximization.  
 
Hypothesis  II:  In  a  vote-differentiated  stock  market  there  will  be  negative  relationship 
between owner concentration and investment performance. 
 
The incentive structure of the owners is of course different in firms that do not allow vote-
differentiated shares. In this type of firms the controlling owners wealth is connected to the 
capital share invested in the firm. The controlling owner’s wealth-maximization objective is 
thus more in line with the shareholders value-maximization objective. Here, the predictions of 
the Jensen and Meckling (1976) modell are expected to hold, with a positive albeit not linear 
relationship  between  the  controlling  owner’s  ownership  stake  and  the  interests  of  the 
shareholders.  
 
As mentioned before the Swedish stock market is characterized by an ownership structure 
with  unusual  strong  separation  of  ownership  and  control.  The  Swedish  stock  market 
regulations  allow  separation  of  ownership  and  control  both  through  the  use  of  vote 
differentiated shares, pyramid ownership structures and cross shareholdings. Through vote-
differentiation it is possible to get control over the firm with a modest share of the equity 
capital. As far as the incentives for enforcing value maximization are primarily related to 
capital share, a vote-differential can be expected to have a negative impact on performance. 
The costs of using the control power for other ends than value maximization decreases with 
vote-differentiation. In some cases it might even be the case that the enhanced control power 
is  used  to  foster  business  interests  in  other  firms  controlled  by  the  dominating  owners. 
Consequently one might expect that the use of the control instrument in vote-differentiated 
firms will have a negative effect on investment performance. To see if this supposition is 
justified we formulate hypothesis III. 
 
Hypothesis III: The use of vote-differentiated shares will have a negative effect on firm’s 
investment performance. 
 
Before we go on to test our hypothesis a short review of earlier empirical studies is provided 
in the next section followed by a description of the method and variables used to test our 
hypothesis in section five. 
 
 
4. Method and Variables 
 
To test the effects of the Swedish ownership structure we adopt the methodology of Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003) and the marginal q developed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). However, 
marginal q is derived in a slightly different way. In standard textbooks on corporate finance, 
such as Brealey and Myers (1991), the net present value rule is introduced as the criterion to   7 
be  used  when  a  firm  evaluates  investments.  The  criterion  requires  for  each  project  a 
comparison between the negative cash flow of the investment (I) and the present value (PV) 
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I is called net present value (NPV). The rule says that all projects with a positive NPV shall be 
undertaken (or in other words accept all projects with NPV = PV - I > 0).  
 
The reason for a firm to make investments in projects with NPV > 0 is that shareholders are 
made  better  off  compared  to  alternative  uses  of  the  funds.  (Hence,  the  wealth  of  the 
shareholder is not increased by a distribution of the funds directly to the shareholders by 
means of repurchase of shares or dividends.) The shareholders referred to are the ones that are 
outsiders in the sense of not working in the firm. As suppliers of capital they are mainly 
interested in the return on the firm’s investments. These shareholders cannot benefit from 
consumption-on-the-job  in  the  way  described  by  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976).  All  their 
consumption takes place outside the firm. (Projects with NPV < 0 can only benefit insiders 
like the management of the firm in the form of on-the-job-consumption.) 
 
The market value of the firm Mt bears a direct relation to the sum of the present values of all 
the running projects that the firm has invested assets in over time. In an efficient stock market 
the market value of the firm is equal to the sum of the present values of these projects. The 
present value (PVt) of investments (It) during a time period will increase the market value of 
the firm if PVt is larger than the depreciation of assets from earlier investments (i.e. Mt – Mt-1 = 
PVt – Depreciation, see e.g. Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2002). 
 
Considering  that  the  market  can  make  errors  in  the  estimation  of  future  cash  flows  the 
expression for change in market value in a period t can be written as 
 
  t t t t on Depreciati PV M M µ + − = − −1           (1) 
 
where µt represents the error the market makes in the estimation of market values. In an 
efficient market, actors make unbiased estimates of the error term and µt has an expected 
value of zero and a nominal distribution around zero. 
 
The net present value rule prescribes that managers shall invest in projects up to the point 
where NPV = 0. Otherwise, the management is not acting in the interest of the shareholders. A 
NPV = 0 implies that PVt = It or that  
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Like Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2002) we can rewrite (2) as 






=                   (3)   8 
with qm = 1 for the project last accepted indicating an efficient investment level, qm > 1 
implying that the firm is not investing enough, and qm < 1 implying managerial discretion. 
 
Inserting (3) in (1) gives   
 
  t t m t t on Depreciati I q M M µ + − = − −1           (4) 
 
As pointed out by Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2002) it can from (3) and (4) easily be seen 
that qm is related to Tobin’s q in a way that justifies the denomination marginal q (qm). While 
Tobin’s q reflects the market value (Mt) divided by the replacement cost of all assets of the 
firm, qm shows the relationship between the cost of a change in the stock of assets and the 
subsequent change in market value. The marginal character is evident. 
 
By dividing both sides of (4) with  1 − t M  a normalization that is useful in empirical testing is 




















δ             (5) 
 
where δ is the depreciation rate 
 
Equation (5) assumes that the capital market is efficient in the sense that future cash flows are 
unbiased estimates. As t grows larger the term 1 − t t M µ will approach 0. 
 
The marginal q, qm, has a number of advantages. First, as mentioned previously, a marginal 
performance measure is more appropriate than an average Tobin’s q, when testing hypotheses 
about managerial discretion. Secondly, qm has a straight forward interpretation. If managers 
invest in a project that yields a return that is less than the cost of capital (rt < it), qm will be < 
1, which means that managers are over-investing. Conversely, if qm > 1 managers are not 
making enough investments, i.e. projects that earn returns higher than the cost of capital are 
not pursued. Thus for the firm to be profit maximizing, qm must be equal to one.  
 
In  order  to  estimate  equation  5  we  need  data  on  the  market  value  of  firms  and  their 
investments. The market value of a firm is defined as all debt plus the total value of all its 
outstanding shares at the end of time t. 
 
Finally a few words about how investment is calculated. According to the originators, Mueller 
and Reardon (1993) and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2002), total investment is defined as 
 
I = After tax profits + Depreciation – Dividends + ∆Debt + ∆Equity + R&D + ADV 
 
where  ∆D  and  ∆E  are  funds  raised  using  new  debt  and  equity  issues.  R&D  and  ADV 
(advertising expenditures) are also forms of investment, which may contribute to a company’s 
market value.  
 
The data used in the regressions is provided by UC-Select and consists of accounting data for 
95  firms  listed  on  the  Stockholm  Stock  Exchange  in  the  period  1997-2002.  The  data  on   9 




The ambition was to produce a balanced panel data set. In order to get a balanced data set 
several criteria were applied in the selection of firms. Excluded from the sample were firms 
with accounting periods less and/or different than a full calendar year running from January to 
December. To be included in the sample the firms also needed to have stock market data 
reported by Affärsvärlden, which is the major Swedish database for stock market data. As a 
result of this second criterion, only firms listed on the so-called A- and O-lists of Stockholm 
Stock Exchange were included. The last selection criterion was that the companies in the 
sample had to be listed on any of these two lists for all of the five years 1997-2002. Banks and 
financial firms were also excluded because of the nature of their investments.  
 
The above-stated criteria ensure liquidity in the share and that valid comparisons can be made 
for exactly the same firms for all years. When all the criteria were satisfied the test population 
had decreased substantially from around 300 companies to 95.  
 
To  test  our  hypothesis  that  the  investment  performance  of  firms  with  vote  differentiated 
shares  is  lower  than  the  investment  performance  in  firms  without  dual-class  shares 
(hypothesis V), the sample firms were divided into two groups, firms with or without vote 
differential. Striking is the low number of Swedish firms with no vote differential, only 21 of 
95 compared to the remaining 74 firms with vote-differentiated shares. This simple arithmetic 
confirms the strong and stable ownership structure described in section two as the general 
model applied in most Swedish firms. 
 
Table 2 offers a description of the variables used in the study. Owing to the prevalence of vote 
differentiated shares in Swedish listed firm, separate ownership measures are provided for the 
distribution of both votes and equity. CR1 and CR5 refer to capital share (equity), while VR1 
and VR5 refer to the shares of votes controlled by 1 and 5 owners respectively.  
 
An  ownership  category  of  special  interest  is  foreign  owners  represented  by  CRFOR  and 
VRFOR. CRFOR refers to capital share controlled by foreign owners and VRFOR refers to 
the number of votes controlled by foreign owners. For further discussion see section 3. A 
description of the variables is provided in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 2.  Description of Variables 
CR1  Percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder.  
 











Percentage of votes controlled by the largest shareholder 
 
Percentage of votes controlled by the five largest shareholders 
 
Dummy variable for vote-differentiation of shares. 1 if the firm makes use of a dual 
class system, 0 if not.  
 
Percentage of equity owned by foreign investors 
 
Percentage of votes controlled by foreign investors 
                                                 
2 Sundin, A. and Sundqvist S-I. (1998-2002).   
   10 
Appendix  1  and  2  contain  correlation  matrices  and  descriptive  statistics  for  each  year 
respectively. For obvious reasons CR1, CR5, VR1 and VR5 display a fairly high correlation. 
CRFOR and VRFOR are, as expected, negatively correlated with these variables.   
 
In  order  to  test  our  hypothesis  regarding  ownership  structure  and  firm  performance  we 
structured  three  panel  data  estimations.  First  we  made  Ordinary  Least  Square  (OLS) 
estimations for all equations, estimating the effects of ownership concentration and the dual 
class share system. The equations were estimated for both marginal q and the valuation ratio. 
The results for the valuation ratio are presented in Appendix 3. The same equations were then 
estimated using a Fixed Effects Model with Period and Group Effects, and a Random Effects 
Model. For all the estimations a balanced panel data set consisting of 475 observations was 
used.  
 
For the regressions made with  1 1) ( − − − t t t M M M as the dependent variable,  1 − t t M I  is used 
as  an  explanatory  variable.  In  addition  to  this  interaction  terms  of  1 − t t M I   and  relevant 
variables  are  employed  in  order  to  test  the  effects  of  ownership  concentration  and  vote 
differentiation.  Thus,  the  equation  estimated  here  has  the  following  general  form: 
XZ X Y 3 2 1 β β β + + = and the marginal effect  ) / ( dX dY is therefore  Z 3 2 β β + which in this 
case has the economic interpretation qm. Following from this we estimate the two following 
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Since  we  estimate  these  equations  for  both  the  single  largest  owner  and  the  five  largest 
owners we estimate in total four equations. Following from our hypothesises we expect the 
first β to be approximately equal to one, the effect of ownership concentration (CRi and VRi) 
we expect to be negative, foreign ownership (CRFOR and VRFOR) is expected to be positive, 
and the use of vote-differentiated shares (VOTDIF) is expected to have a negative impact. It 
should be noted that the error term εi is a standard regression error term and is not the same as 
the error term, µi, in the theoretical equation (5). The intercept δ is, as noted earlier, the rate of 




5. Findings and analysis 
 
In our sample close to 70 percent of the firms have vote-differentiated shares. Furthermore, 
the  largest  single  owner  has,  on  average,  a  capital  share  around  25  per  cent  and  foreign 
                                                 
3 Note that when differentiating with respect to investments, It, the deprecation rate, δ, disappear, and hence have 
no relevance for the interpretation of qm.     11 
owners on average a capital share around 18 to 19 per cent in the Swedish listed firms (see 
Appendix 2). This is far from the dispersed ownership of large corporations that Berle and 
Means (1932) analyzed. According to them firms with dispersed ownership had less than 20 
per cent of the shares (votes) controlled by one owner.  Appendix 2 shows that the ownership 
concentration in terms of vote shares widely exceeds the capital share concentration. The 
largest owner has on average a vote share of 37 to 39 per cent compared to the 25 per cent 
capital share. This is the statistical background to our hypotheses of the impact of ownership 
on investment performance in a vote-differentiated stock market. To test our hypotheses, we 
employ three estimation procedures, for the case when only the largest owner’s shares of 
capital and votes, and for the case when the five largest owners´ share of capital and votes are 
studied.  
 
The results from these regressions are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3A contains the 
results for CR1, CRFOR and VOTDIF. Table 3B contains the results for VR1, VRFOR and 
VOTDIF. In Table 4, CR1 and VR1 have been replaced with CR5 and VR5 respectively.  
 
 
Table 3  Regression results (the largest shareholder) 
 
Estimation method       
 
Panel estimation 
OLS      Fixed effects model with 
group and period effects  
    Random effects model  
 
 
      
  Coeffic. 
 
  t-Value         
  Coeffic. 
 






A: Dependent variable:   1 1 / ) ( − − − t t t M M M    
 
1 − t t M I  
 
0.852   
 
4.89     
 
1.437   
 
5.59     
 
1.126   
 
5.37   
 
1 ) ( 1 CR M I t t −  
 
-0.009   
 
-2.94     
 
-0.014   
 
-3.44     
 
-0.011   
 
 -3.09   
 
CRFOR M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
0.016   
 
3.36     
 
0.018   
 
2.36     
 
0.016   
 
2.86   
 
VOTDIF M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
-0.449   
 
-3.37     
 
-0.769   
 
-3.88     
 
-0.557   
 





0.171         
 
0.369         
 





0.164         
 




24.22         
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475         
 
475     
 
 
B: Dependent variable:   1 1 / ) ( − − − t t t M M M  
     
 
1 − t t M I  
 
0.831   
 
4.95     
 
1.467   
 
6.09     
 






1 ) ( 1 VR M I t t −  
 
-0.006   
 
-2.79     
 
-0.011   
 
-3.57     
 
-0.008   
 




VRFOR M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
0.013   
 
2.61     
 
0.011   
 
1.47     
 
0.012   
 




VOTDIF M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
-0.332   
 
-2.19     
 
-0.640   
 
2.94     
 









0.155         
 
0.359         
 





0.148         
 




21.64         
 





475         
 
475         
 
475       
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 Table 4  Regression results (the five largest shareholders) 
 
Estimation method       
 
Panel estimation 
OLS      Fixed effects model with 
group and period effects  
    Random effects model  
 
 
      
  Coeffic. 
 
  t-Value         
  Coeffic. 
 






A: Dependent variable:   1 1 / ) ( − − − t t t M M M    
 
1 − t t M I  
 
1.036   
 
4.75     
 
1.702   
 
5.60     
 
1.269   
 
5.04   
 
5 ) ( 1 CR M I t t −  
 
-0.009   
 
-3.00     
 
-0.015   
 
-3.58     
 
-0.011    -3.19   
 
CRFOR M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
0.017   
 
3.58     
 
0.021   
 
3.00     
 
0.018    3.22   
 
VOTDIF M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
-0.436   
 
-3.24     
 
-0.725   
 
-3.60     
 





0.172         
 
0.371         
 





0.165         
 




24.33         
 




475         
 
475         
 
475       
 
 
B: Dependent variable:   1 1 / ) ( − − − t t t M M M  
     
 
1 − t t M I  
 
0.874   
 
3.99     
 
1.546   
 
5.19     
 
1.097   
 
4.40   
 
5 ) ( 1 VR M I t t −  
 
-0.006   
 
-1.90     
 
-0.010   
 
-2.58     
 






VRFOR M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
0.016   
 
3.24     
 
0.017   
 
2.43     
 
0.016   
 
2.80   
 
VOTDIF M I t t ) ( 1 −  
 
-0.373       -2.31     
 
-0.685   
 
-2.98     
 
-0.467       





0.148         
 
0.348         
 





0.141         
 




20.41         
 





475         
 
475         
 
475       
 
 
The OLS-estimates are significant for all variables and confirm the results in the two other 
models. However, as the fixed effects model, which takes into account both period and group 
dummy  effects,  is  a  more  efficient  estimation  model  for  our  purposes  and  since  its 
explanatory value is higher, we continue our analysis focusing mainly on the results from the 
fixed effects model. The results are very stable since all three estimation procedures yield the 
same  result,  however  the  Hausman  test  indicates  that  the  fix  effects  model  is  the  best 
estimation.  
 
The Fixed Effects Model estimates have the strongest explanatory value with an R
2 equal to 
0.369. When looking at capital share, one owner, an average Swedish firm with dual-class 
shares has an estimated qm = 0.653
4 (0.658 for capital share five owners (CR5)). This is 
remarkably consistent with the findings of Gugler et al (2002) who estimates an average qm 
for Sweden to 0.65. This implies that firm managers invest in projects that earn on average 
34.7  per  cent  less  than  the  cost  of  capital.  Thus,  they  must  be  interpreted  as  investment 
failures. For hypothetical firms with low ownership concentration we estimate qm’s that are 
closer to one. This also holds, mutatis mutandis, for firms with only one class of shares. That 
is, as the ownership concentration increases the investment performance declines.  
 
                                                 
4 The number is attained by plugging in the regression coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model with 
respect to the capital share regression (A).   13 
According to hypothesis I it is expected that foreign ownership will have a positive impact on 
investment performance. This is confirmed with high significance in all the three estimation 
models, both when using the ownership concentration of the largest single owner and the 
aggregate  ownership  of  the  five  largest  together;  see  Tables  3  and  4.  The  positive  and 
significant impact of foreign ownership on performance confirms earlier findings on Swedish 
data made in Bjuggren and Bohman (2002). 
 
Foreign investors driven mainly by portfolio choice motives were expected to move their 
assets  into  firms  with  positive  investment  opportunities.  But  they  where  also  assumed  to 
belong to a category of investors that not only demand shareholder value maximization but 
also enforce the pursuit of such strategies (both these effects are accounted for in hypothesis 
I).  It is  also  likely that foreign  investors  prefer  to  invest  in firms  with  a  more  dispersed 
ownership structure. Consequently, firms with more owners focused on shareholder value 
rather than in owner/manager-led firms. When separate estimations are performed for the two 
groups, with or without dual class shares, it is easy to see that the foreign ownership presence 
is much larger in firms without dual-class shares. This supports the idea that foreign investors 
if possible (from a portfolio perspective) avoid firms with highly concentrated ownership 
structures. The summary statistics (appendix 2) also shows that foreign owners have a low 
share of votes given their share of invested capital ( CRFOR is low compared to VRFOR) 
Foreign owners are thus biased towards shares with lower voting power. 
 
In  line  with  the  reasoning  regarding  the  special characteristics  of  the  Swedish  ownership 
structure,  one  would  expect  a  negative  impact  of  concentrated  ownership  on  investment 
performance of Swedish listed firms (hypothesis II). This negative relationship is significant 
in all the estimations. What this tells us is that the Swedish model of ownership structure with 
its  characteristics  of  strong  controlling  owners  and  separation  of  vote  and  capital  shares 
suffers from some drawbacks.  
 
As emphasised earlier one characteristic of the Swedish ownership system is the existence of 
vote-differentiated shares. This allows investors to maintain control of firms with a relatively 
small  share  of  equity.  In  our  sample  the  concentration  of  votes  is  higher  than  the 
concentration  of  capital  (equity)  for  both  measures  of  ownership  concentration,  CR1  and 
CR5,  as  compared  to  VR1  and  VR5  respectively.  Controlling  owners  are  biased  towards 
shares with higher voting-power.  
 
A possible explanation for the negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance is the possibility for controlling owners to exploit minority investors and cater to 
other than shareholder value maximization objectives. A dominating owner,  may actively 
chose  investments  in  line  with  personal  interests  rather  than  those  of  the  remaining 
shareholders, i.e. choose investments that do not benefit shareholders in general. As already 
noted  the  single  largest  shareholder  in  the  firms  studied  has  an  ownership  stake  which 
controls on average around 38 per cent of the votes. This is in most cases enough to control 
the firm and benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. 
 
When  the  estimations  are  made  for  the  aggregate  ownership  stakes  of  the  five  largest 
shareholders, this picture becomes even clearer, see Table 4. On average five owners control 
together more than 61 per cent of the votes in the sample firms (see summary statistics in 
Appendix 2). It is apparent that the Swedish stock market is less dispersed in ownership than 
one  might  first  expect.  The  effect  of  the  aggregate  ownership  stakes  of  the  five  largest   14 
shareholders on investment performance is also in line with hypothesis II, that is, significantly 
negative when estimated in any of the models.  
 
The third variable that is tested is vote-differential. In firms which have dual-class shares 
minority misappropriation and less than efficient use of the firms’ resources are a more likely 
event. In line with this reasoning one would expect a negative effect of vote-differential on 
investment performance and valuation (hypothesis III). Indeed, in all three estimation models 
and for every ownership category used we find a negative and significant effect of vote-
differential on investment performance.
5  
 
Finally a caveat about causality can be made. The holdings by foreign investors might be 
associated with problems of reversed causality. Foreign portfolio investors are likely to be 
well apt to identify well performing firms and invest in them. Likewise foreign investors are 
likely to leave firms that are underperforming. To put it differently, portfolio inventors are 
likely to exit an underperforming firm rather than to exercis voice.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
There are many facets to ownership structure which makes it a difficult topic to study. The 
dual-class share system is one aspect of corporate governance that potentially has far-reaching 
consequences  for  the  long-run  performance  of  industries.  We  have  chosen  to  look  at  the 
Swedish ownership structure from three different perspectives. Besides the more traditional 
variables on ownership concentration, we also look at the ownership of foreigners and the 
impact of vote-differentiation and the dual-class share system in general. A distinction is 
made between capital share and voting share.  
 
An important result is the negative impact of vote-differentiation and ownership concentration 
on firm value and investment performance. The Swedish model of corporate governance does 
not seem to function so well. We also found that foreign ownership seems to be susceptible to 
how well a firm performs. A positive relationship between foreign ownership and investment 
performance and firm value is found. Furthermore, for foreign owners there is a bias towards 
ownership of shares with lower voting power. A portfolio type of behaviour is put forward as 
an explanation for these results.  
 
As this study adds to a rather new tradition of using marginal q as performance, it is also 
worth noting that the low marginal q obtained (implying poor investment performance) is 
remarkably  consistent  with  the  earlier  results  obtained  by  Gugler,  Mueller  and  Yurtoglu 
(2002).  
                                                 
5 Separate regressions were estimated when the sample firms were divided into two subsets, with or without 
vote-differential. These regressions supported the findings in Tables 3 and 4. As the results were generally the 
same, these regressions are excluded but are available upon request; suffice it to say that the results in Table 3 
and 4 in this way are confirmed. 
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Appendix 1  Correlation matrixes 
 
Correlation matrix 1998 
  CR1  CR5  CRFOR  VR1  VR5  VRFOR 
CR1  1  0.835    -0.498    0.753    0.607    -0.413   
CR5    1    -0.551    0.669    0.740    -0.456   
CRFOR        1    -0.392    -0.378    0.822   
VR1            1    0.831    -0.542   
VR5                1    -0.606   
VRFOR                    1   
               
 
Correlation matrix 1999 
  CR1  CR5  CRFOR  VR1  VR5  VRFOR 
CR1  1  0.826    -0.440    0.765    0.648    -0.389   
CR5    1    -0.485    0.672    0.792    -0.417   
CRFOR        1    -0.355    -0.390    0.877   
VR1            1    0.831    -0.473   
VR5                1    -0.522   
VRFOR                    1   
               
 
Correlation matrix 2000 
  CR1  CR5  CRFOR  VR1  VR5  VRFOR 
CR1  1  0.844    -0.423    0.734    0.632    -0.334   
CR5    1    -0.457    0.634    0.754    -0.307   
CRFOR        1    -0.340    -0.369    0.858   
VR1            1    0.818    -0.414   
VR5                1    -0.437   
VRFOR                    1   
               
 
Correlation matrix 2001 
  CR1  CR5  CRFOR  VR1  VR5  VRFOR 
CR1  1  0.826    -0.346    0.739    0.615    -0.275   
CR5    1    -0.373    0.647    0.781    -0.280   
CRFOR        1    -0.325    -0.322    0.906   
VR1            1    0.807    -0.423   
VR5                1    -0.408   
VRFOR                    1   
               
 
Correlation matrix 2002  
  CR1  CR5  CRFOR  VR1  VR5  VRFOR 
CR1  1  0.803    -0.298    0.737    0.610    -0.236   
CR5    1    -0321    0.600    0.772    -0.222   
CRFOR        1    -0.266    -0.294    0.915   
VR1            1    0.784    -0.383   
VR5                1    -0.380   
VRFOR                    1   
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Appendix 2  Descriptive statistics  
 
     Descriptive statistics 1998 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 1999 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 2000 
 
 
  Descriptive statistics 2001 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 2002 
 
 
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  No. observ.   
CR1  24.8    16.1    3.8    71.3    95       
CR5  47.9    18.4    10.0    91.0    95       
CRFOR  18.1    16.2    0    67.6    95       
VR1  38.7    22.8    4.4    95.1    95       
VR5  61.6    22.1    10.8    97.6    95       
VRFOR  13.2    14.6    0    63.2    95       
                 
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  No. observ.   
CR1  25.1    16.0    4.0    70.6    95       
CR5  49.3    18.0    8.9    91.8    95       
CRFOR  18.2    16.7    0    62.0    95       
VR1  38.9    22.4    4.6    93.7    95       
VR5  62.0    21.7    9.6    98.3    95       
VRFOR  14.4    16.3    0    62.0    95       
                 
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  No. observ.   
CR1  25.8    16.2    3.7    73.7    95       
CR5  49.4    18.5    13.4    91.9    95       
CRFOR  17.6    15.8    0.3    59.5    95       
VR1  39.2    21.5    5.6    89.5    95       
VR5  62.4    20.4    16.1    97.9    95       
VRFOR  14.6    16.3    0.1    63.1    95       
                 
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  No. observ.   
CR1  25.3    15.5    4.8    74.5    95       
CR5  47.5    18.9    12.8    91.7    95       
CRFOR  20.1    18.2    0.3    90.2    95       
VR1  37.9    21.1    5.0    90.6    95       
VR5  59.7    21.8    14.7    97.1    95       
VRFOR  16.7    18.3    0.1    90.2    95       
                 
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  No. observ.   
CR1  24.6    15.3    4.7    72.8    95       
CR5  48.6    19.1    12.7    92.4    95       
CRFOR  19.5    17.2    0.5    88.2    95       
VR1  36.6    20.8    5.0    90.6    95       
VR5  60.4    21.2    15.9    96.6    95       
VRFOR  15.8    17.2    0.2    88.2    95       
                 